How many more days of mourning?

By Shamim-ur-Rahman

Yet another day of mourning passed in Karachi without any qualitative change in the ground realities. Although the shutters were pulled down on Muttahida’s call in which others also joined, the guns did not fall silent and fear of the unknown loomed large as there was no guarantee for security of life and property of the people.

The decline in death toll on the day of mourning was surprising and one wonders whether it was due to mutually agreed truce between the armed mafias and their protectors or was it a coincidence. Where the armed men had fizzled out? The element of fear and insecurity has gripped the psyche of the people of Karachi who are being sucked into a black whole due to short sighted, inept and corrupt political leadership; inefficient state apparatus to deal with the menace of terrorism; and the undeclared turf war between ambitious Establishment and the political leadership.

While the government lacks the capacity to come hard on the terrorists, other stake holders and political parties are not willing to accept their responsibility in spoiling the broth. Terrorist seem to have the initiative because of the absence of a well trained and well equipped police force and lack of efficient intelligence network to track down the killers. It is common knowledge that good intelligence is key to the success of any operation. But the government seems to have not realized its importance and believes in mere show of force by temporarily deploying Police or Rangers at different places. Interior minister Rahman Malik has made a mockery of operations against the terrorists by every now and then making promises that he never honoured, thus causing further criticism of the government. Instead of injecting fear among the terrorist through indiscriminate actions he has instilled fear among the rulers and compelled them to remain in a state of perpetual siege, instead of being among the people. Experts believe that if at all the government was serious about dealing with the menace of terrorism and gun running, it will have to resort to non-partisan community policing backed by strong intelligence gathering network.

Despite all the manslaughter the major stake holders are not prepared to come out of the state of denial and face facts. Facts that are common sense and are known to one and all. To deal with terrorism in Karachi it is imperative for the leadership of different political parties to isolate militant armed groups they support. Without that there can be no end to killings and proliferation of weapons of all sorts. Unfortunately in the current phase of bloodletting in the city it was just the opposite.Policing has to be reorganized in more scientific manner and merit should be the sole criteria.

We have failed in curbing crime and terrorism through police because it is said that many of them got the job after paying bribe to their superiors. So their main objective is to make more money, even if it came from supporting the mafia’s interests. That is one of the reasons why Karachi is bleeding.

Everyday we hear the sermon that Karachi is economic hub of Pakistan and its stability was key to the country’s progress and security, but the administrative measures required to ensure that are lacking. The breakdown of administrative apparatus infested with corruption has provided upper hand to the terrorists.

Terrorism in Karachi has become a thriving economic proposition at the expense of the state. Terrorism is thriving due to corruption of law enforcement machinery and other decision makers and is eroding the state foundations like termite. But the big question is who is providing these resources? Is it philanthropy or investment? If it was philanthropy then this kind of money could easily set up aperson in small business or pay for his education. Why is philanthropy being shown in buying weapons and killing people? If this is an investment then where from are the returns of this investment in crime coming? Who are the main partners, besides themain investors? How is the surplus created and distributed? What is the methodology of earning huge profits through the use of guns and terror? How this methodology is being put in practice?Investments are always made in areas where the returns are expected tobe the maximum. Why the investments are being made in Karachi? Why not elsewhere?

Karachi is the best option for these investments since this is the place where the wealth is. A good portion of Karachi’s wealth is regularly siphoned off in the form of bribes, tax evasion, extortion at gun point, grabbing of assets and many other ways. The functionaries of the state, whose prime duty it is to stop this siphoning off of wealth have over a period of time become partners in this loot. From income tax employees to the purchase departments of so many institutions to police department official there is no dearth of persons who are a part and parcel of this urban “economic model”.But these are ones that have the academic qualification and haveregular employments in the state structure.

There is a multitude that can be placed in the category of those who do not have a means of living, neither can find one and have to live on the resources of others either begged or snatched. They don’t have the authority and the powers of the state. They have to depend on their muscle/gun power. Hence the menace of extortion, land grabbing, narcotics trade, kidnapping for ransom, smuggling and flesh trade, and gun running. All these operations, rather all commercial operations are competitive. In philanthropies different stake holders co-operate with each other. In commercial operations there is fierce competition for additional space. Those who do not grow ultimately perish. So there comes no point where one is satisfied with the space or the wealth he has acquired. Rather the larger and more powerful one is the more is the need to dominate and to oppress, to acquire an even larger space.These mafias compete for space, or areas within Karachi. Those who pay include ‘Bhatta’ in their cost of production or business expensesand pass on the costs to ultimate consumers. Those who receive Bhatta also divide it according to well established “Sharing Formulas” amongall stake holders.

Whether political parties accept or not it is common knowledge that mafia’s provide the required funds for electioneering and muscle power to some political parties. Some parties that have to depend on their genuine voters try to discourage the involvement of militants since it is bad for their image and diminishes public support for them. Some tolerate them and also use them in certain situations in a defensive mode. Others put total reliance on them for generating funds not only for the running of their party but also for ostentatious living of their leaders and workers. Those who depend on stamping of ballot papers have no use for the genuine voters. They depend on occupying polling stations by force and terrorizing the people to keep them away from polling stations where they do not expect to get votes. That is where the militants come handy. Target killings are operations carried out to eliminate rival cadres and to inject the element of fear in them besides preventing them from entering their territory.Very often the group if not the particular killer is known to the local police and the local population. Encroachments and entries into “enemy” territories are also not possible without police cover and support. Thus which group is indulging in crime in which area is an open secret. Those who suffer know best and fully as to who are oppressing them.

Citizens are the ultimate sufferers both as indirect payers of extortions and victims of turf war between militants. They also have all the knowledge about the perpetrators of the crime. Fear about their own safety and the safety of their kith and kin stops themfrom coming forward and resisting the militants. Police personnel specially those at the lower level while being fully aware of the identity of the criminals and being fully capable of acting against them do not do so because of fear of reprisals.

Fear of the militants has reached a level where even if acriminal is arrested; the prosecution makes a weak case against him. Situation can only improve if political parties decided among themselves to back the political process, not the militants, and sort out their differences through negotiations instead of fighting it out in the streets of Karachi. --ENDS

battlefield city

Battlefield city
By: Shamim-ur-Rahman

Internecine political battles are making Karachi a dangerous place to live




A new extremism has developed in Pakistan’s economic hub, Karachi, a city that is increasingly serving as a safe haven for extremist groups backed by criminal mafias and certain political elements. The reported arrest of a top Taliban leader, Mulla Abdul Ghani Baradar, from the outskirts of Karachi in mid-February has only made this new dynamic clearer, and more ominous. The arrest not only proved that the network of al-Qaeda- and Taliban-linked fighters is well-entrenched and active across the north-south length of Pakistan; but the joint operation, conducted by Pakistan and American intelligence operatives, also sent a message that Pakistan might no longer be the safe haven that it once was. However, if the government fails to address ‘bread and butter’ issues – providing employment, controlling inflation and ensuring the availability of essential items – and the political parties continue to fight among themselves for narrow vested interests, the Taliban could still spring a surprise. If this happened, it would most likely be with the support of the sizeable fundamentalist-minded and generally disgruntled segments of Pakistani society.

The sheer number, scale and consistency of the attacks on Karachi are all adding to the worries of already disoriented city citizens. From October 2009 through mid-February, about 200 people have been killed in both politically motivated targeted killings and extremist blasts in various parts of Karachi, while several hundred more have been injured. Alongside, billions of rupees have been lost due to looting, arson and the closure of businesses during strikes that have been called by various political parties to highlight the lack of security. Yet while extremist attacks are getting much of the headlines and anger, the city has been under particular pressure due to the targeted killing of activists aligned with various political outfits – the Sindh-based Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) of the late Benazir Bhutto, the Pashtun-dominated Awami National Party (ANP), the sectarian Sunni Tehrik, the Islamist Jamaat-i-Islami and others. Incredibly, even as the violence mounts, the MQM, PPP and ANP technically remain in a coalition government together.

Most of the time, these assassinations are being carried out by workers aligned with one or the other of these parties. But after each spell of killings, as a response to public outrage, the parties have shifted the blame away from themselves, placing it instead on the ‘land mafia’ and other criminal elements. There is little attempt at introspection and weeding out violent elements from within their own rank and file. Of course, it has come as a shock to many that the three coalition partners in Sindh and in the federal government have been accused of involvement in the recent wave of violence and killings in Karachi, endangering, in addition to public safety, the survival of their own government in Sindh. It is no exaggeration to say that, with the cadre of all three heavily armed and trained in the use of firearms, clashes between the party workers now threaten to plunge the city into a prolonged bloodbath.

Complicating matters further, criminal elements are offering significant assistance to the extremists. Drug money and funds collected by the criminal mafia and extremists are being used to make inroads into various political and religious parties, which need funds to advance their political agendas. For instance, according to senior government officials, both the MQM and the ANP have dons at their behest extorting money, kidnapping for ransom and robbing banks, though both parties have dismissed such charges. Speaking on condition of anonymity, some Western intelligence operatives allege that some of these elements are enjoying the protection of those in the country’s establishment. This view is generally derived from the oft-repeated American reports that Islamabad might be sheltering Taliban fighters in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.

Pakistani authorities have vehemently rejected such allegations, however, pointing to the manner in which, in recent months, the Pakistan military had gone into Swat and Waziristan to carry out attacks on militant strongholds. Pakistani authorities insist that most of the militants operating in Pakistan’s tribal areas are actually receiving funds and weapons from the Indian and Israeli agencies, purportedly as part of an ongoing proxy war via Afghanistan. Yet while Pakistani authorities claim to have evidence of Indian involvement in the attacks, they have yet to provide any credible evidence.

Bad for business
While the network of al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives is clearly active in Pakistan today, the apprehension that they will take over Karachi is misplaced. Currently, such scaremongering is being used by MQM sloganeers, evidently in a bid to attract Western support for assistance in easing out much of Karachi’s Pashtun community, who the muhajirs of the MQM view as posing a serious challenge to the party’s longstanding political control over the city. In the past, the MQM and Pashtun have fought ethnically motivated battles on the streets of Karachi, in which certain segments of the security agencies have played an important role. Most importantly, the Pashtun are politically divided between the ANP, the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Jamiat Ulema Islam, while offering almost no support to the MQM.

Critics of the MQM maintain that the party is deliberately using the bogey of Talibanisation to distract attention from its attempts to gain control of more land in the city (see Himal July 2009, “Capturing Karachi”). The MQM deputy convener, Farooq Sattar, has made the accusation that “large numbers of Waziris and Mehsuds fleeing operations in Pakistan’s insurgency-hit tribal areas are settling down in Karachi, undermining the security environment of the city.” Sattar says this anxiety on the part of the MQM has increased significantly over the past year, as tens of thousands of Pashtun have fled the fighting in Swat and Waziristan and arrived in Karachi. As a result, the ANP has suddenly gained strength in the metropolis. There are significant economics at stake, too, with the influx having implications for the hot commodity of Karachi real estate. Activists of all Sindhi political parties are involved in land-grabbing, and the MQM has long been one of the most powerful in this regard. But the growing Pashtun community has led to a strengthened ANP, which evidently is now cutting into what the MQM sees as its ‘business’.

Meanwhile, the MQM has long used its clout over the now-dissolved local-bodies system of the city district government, which completed its four-year term in October 2009 but was given an extension until 31 December. Pashtuns who ave settled in Karachi, as well as the ANP, are now demanding more representation on the ground. Thus, many now believe the appalling law-and-order situation in Karachi to be a direct result of MQM attempts to re-enforce the party’s political and administrative control of the city, in the face of the ANP challenge. The warnings of a ‘growing’ Talibanisation represent a potent card, given the significant support for the ANP that comes from the Pashtun community, accused of harbouring Taliban fighters.

At this critical junction, the provincial government has expressed its determination to restore law and order in Karachi. In this context, it has called upon the police and paramilitary Rangers to use “ruthlessness”, and to shoot suspected extremists on sight. But all the while, the trust deficit between the political parties in Sindh is growing to a dangerous peak. Amidst the burgeoning volcano, one cannot rule out the possibility of a collapse of the PPP-MQM alliance during the upcoming local elections. Given the trends of recent months, such a turn of events would be politically catastrophic, plunging the city into a cycle of violence that could resemble the volatile times of the early 1990s.


(Published in HIMAL SouthAsian's March 2010 issue)

Shamim-ur-Rahman is a journalist in Karachi.